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Chapter 6
Fees, Framing, and Financial Literacy
in the Choice of Pension Manager
Justine Hastings, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Eric Chyn
‘If households make investment mistakes, it may be possible for
financial economists to offer remedies that reduce the inci-
dence and welfare costs of these mistakes.’
—John Campbell, Presidential Address to the American Fi-
nance Association (2006)
Recent research and policy analysis has begun to explore the nexus bet-
ween financial literacy and household saving for several reasons. First,
financial literacy levels in the general population are remarkably low,
both in the United States and elsewhere (Bernheim et al., 2001; Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009; Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton,
2008) which poses grave concern about whether consumers are capable
of making sensible saving and investment decisions (Hilgert et al., 2003;
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2010). Second, financial products are growing in-
creasingly complex (e.g., ‘teaser rates’ in credit cards and ‘no-income-no-
down-payment mortgages’), which would seem to undermine the long-
term trend toward asking individuals to assume greater control over their
retirement accounts and other investments (Campbell, 2006). Indeed,
prior research finds that many people tend to be overly sensitive to framing
of saving and investment decisions, chase past returns even in passively
managed index funds, and take out too much debt (Ausubel, 1991; Be-
nartzi and Thaler, 2001; Choi et al., 2007; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004;
Lusardi and Tufano, 2008; Ponce-Rodriguez, 2008). Furthermore, those
who prove to be least financially literate also tend to be among the most
economically vulnerable, such as minorities, the least-educated, women,
and low earners (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006, 2008, 2010). Consequently,
those who most need financial skills and tools with which to make optimal
financial decisions also prove to be the least well-equipped, rendering the
already-disadvantaged even more vulnerable, and potentially impairing the
efficient functioning of financial markets.
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The present study offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the relation-
ship between financial literacy and economic outcomes, exploring how the
presentation of fees and charges for financial services can help people
make the most cost-effective saving decisions. Specifically, we evaluate the
role of framing in shaping peoples’ awareness of fees and commissions
associated with retirement saving. We ask whether people are more or less
sensitive to pension fee information presented as gains versus losses, and
we also evaluate whether less financially literate individuals are more or less
sensitive to the way in which fees and commissions are presented.
The question of how people select pension fund managers and integrate
fees into this decision process is particularly important in Chile, a nation
that mandated private defined contribution (DC) pensions in 1981.1 Yet
even after almost thirty years of the AFP system (Asociacio´n de Fondos de
Pensiones), many participants appear to have only a rudimentary under-
standing of how these costs affect their pension accumulations (Arenas
et al., 2008). In the present chapter, we draw on a new study that we
conducted in cooperation with the Chilean Social Protection Survey
(EPS, or Encuesta de Proteccio´n Social) to examine the factors that influ-
ence worker selection of pension fund managers and to assess how framing
of pension costs might further influence this retirement choice. Our par-
ticular focus is to assess the degree to which financial illiteracy can be
overcome via different ways of presenting pension fund fees and charges.
We find that individuals with lower levels of education, income, and finan-
cial literacy depend more on employers, friends, and coworkers than on
cost fundamentals when selecting a pension fund from a menu of possible
offerings. We also find that these same types of individuals are more
responsive to information framing when interpreting the relative benefits
of different investment choices.
The discussion proceeds in three parts. First, we offer a brief background
on the Chilean pension system and our experimental design. Next, we
provide a descriptive analysis of selected characteristics of our sample
population and the experimental results. A final section reviews the results,
and concludes with some thoughts on the implications these results have
on addressing issues of financial literacy and retirement planning.
Setting, experimental methodology, and data
Chile’s national retirement system was privatized in 1981, and today pen-
sion accruals are substantial, since contributions total 10 percent of wages
for workers in the formal sector. Fund managers charge a front-end load
fee on contributions and invest the assets following a DC approach; these
fees have a small but economically significant impact on investment re-
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turns. Workers must select which pension manager they wish to hire to
manage their retirement accumulations, and only one manager can be
selected at a time. Statistics on each fund manager’s load and past return
experience appear on the Chilean Government’s Pension Superintendency
website and are provided to participants in annual statements mailed to
their residence. At present, the official government website reports monthly
fees in pesos for each AFP relative to the cheapest AFP, while participant
statements received annually present fees in annual percentage terms. Both
of these approaches depict the data in terms of one-year results.
Despite the fact that the DC pension system has been in place in Chile for
several decades, there is evidence that many people still do not understand
the system’s contribution and benefit structures. For instance, Arenas et al.
(2008) report that many people do not know what contribution require-
ments are under the system, how much they pay in commissions, and how
they have their funds invested. Mitchell et al. (2008) find that very few
Chileans are aware of what commissions or fees are charged on their
pension accruals. Moreover, this lack of understanding is concentrated
among women, the lowest paid, and the least educated, the very groups
most at risk of falling short of retirement saving.
For this reason, there is substantial interest in determining how to
enhance participants’ understanding and awareness of how fees and
charges influence pension accumulations. One way to accomplish this is
to determine whether people become more price-sensitive to fees when
they are depicted in alternative formats. Specifically, a pilot study in Mexico
(Hastings and Tejada-Ashton, 2008) suggested that giving workers infor-
mation in pesos rather than annual percentage fees can alter how workers
rank their pension fund options. That study did not, however, explore
whether behavior is influenced more strongly when the long-term impact
of gains or losses is illustrated.
In what follows, we report on a special experiment that we designed and
implemented in the Chilean EPS to determine whether showing workers
different information on pension fund fees alters respondents’ responses
regarding their ranking of pension funds on a menu of possible choices.
Specifically, in the 2009 EPS survey, we randomly presented two choices to
interviewees, showing them hypothetical pension outcomes in terms of
gains and losses in pesos over a ten-year period. For each of the five AFPs
in the system at the time of the survey, we calculated the expected balance
for each surveyed individual using the past returns and commissions of the
AFPs and each individual’s wage, balance, age, and gender responses in the
demographic section of the survey.2 We hypothesize that individuals will
be better able to understand the impact of higher AFP fees when these fees
are reported as influencing the gains from contributing to a pension versus
losses. To test this hypothesis, one set of respondents received a document
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showing how hypothetical AFP account balances would be anticipated to
grow depending on each AFP’s actual fees, where the results were pro-
jected over a ten-year period. The second group received a document
showing the difference between the largest accounts that one might antici-
pate from selecting the lowest-cost AFP versus the likely accumulation in
the more expensive AFPs over the same period. After receiving a randomly
assigned fee information sheet, each respondent was then asked to rank
three AFPs to recommend to a hypothetical close friend who wished to
figure out where to invest his pension money. This recommendation was
recorded by the interviewer, and the sheets were left with the respondents
post-interview. Comparing these two groups will indicate whether the
presentation of fund fees as gains or losses in peso terms is associated
with the respondent selecting the lowest-cost pension fund manager.3
The nationally representative sample of individuals surveyed in the EPS
also includes a rich set of information on individual-level characteristics,
which we use to determine which individuals are most influenced by how
pension fund fees are presented. Beginning in 2002, and following up in
2004, 2006, and 2009, the University of Chile’s Microdata Center has
included in the EPS a wide range of questions similar to those used in
the USHealth and Retirement Study (HRS) (NIA/NIH, n.d.); this includes
extensive information on schooling, labor market history, health, pension
system participation, and investment behavior, as well as wealth.4 The EPS
also asks respondents to answer several questions measuring financial
literacy and risk preferences (devised by Lusardi and Mitchell [2007a,
2007b] and used by Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton [2008]). Here, we focus
on two sets of questions, with the first set being the ‘basic’ financial literacy
questions and the second the more ‘sophisticated’ set:5
1. Basic financial literacy questions:
 Chance of disease: If the chance of catching an illness is 10 percent, how
many people out of 1000 would get the illness?
 Lottery: If five people share winning lottery tickets and the total prize is
2 million Chilean pesos, how much would each receive?
 Numeracy in investment context: Assume that you have $100 in a savings
account and the interest rate you earn on this money is 2 percent a
year. If you keep this money in the account for five years, how much
would you have after five years? Choose one: more than $102, exactly
$102, or less than $102.
A second set of questions measures more sophisticated financial literacy
concepts, such as compound interest, inflation, and risk diversification; it
has also been fielded in an HRS module (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009).
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2. Sophisticated financial literacy questions:
 Compound interest: Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and
the interest rate that you earn on these savings is 10 percent a year.
How much would you have in the account after two years?
 Inflation: Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the
interest rate that you earn on these savings is 1 percent a year. Inflation
is 2 percent a year. After one year, if you withdraw the money from the
savings account, you could buy more/less/the same?
 Risk diversification: Buying shares in one company is less risky than
buying shares from many different companies with the same money.
True/False?
Using these questions, we first evaluate individual differences in financial
literacy, and, second, assess whether people with different attributes res-
pond to the distinct formats for pension fees in terms of selecting the
lowest-cost pension fund manager.
Findings
Table 6.1 reports summary statistics for the total number of financial
literacy questions answered correctly arrayed by respondent characteristics
including their age, sex, education, income, and whether the respondent
had any form of saving. On average, younger individuals and men were
more likely to give correct answers to more of the financial literacy ques-
tions. Similarly, financial literacy rises strongly with education levels, with
those getting over half of the questions correct being more likely to have
completed at least their secondary schooling. Average monthly income
levels were also strongly positively correlated with financial literacy, as
was the propensity to have some form of saving, and to be a member of
an AFP plan.
Next, we focus on AFP participants (as self-identified) and examine how
respondents performed on specific financial literacy questions. Table 6.2
shows that those who answered each question correctly were more likely
than those who did not know the correct answers to have higher monthly
income, to have secondary education, and to have some form of saving. Of
particular interest is the Compound interest question, which asked respon-
dents to calculate the exact amount they would have in a saving account
after two years if they started with $200 and the account paid 10 percent
interest annually. Very few—only 154 respondents out of more than 8,000
asked the question—answered it correctly, giving a response of $242. This
handful of respondents was substantially wealthier and more educated
than the sample as a whole.
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Table 6.2 Financial literacy responses and respondent characteristics of AFP
participants
Financial
literacy
question
Age
(years)
Male
(%)
Secondary
education (%)
Average monthly
income (CP$)
Any
savings
(%)*
Chance of
disease
43 58 48 397,895 31
Lottery 44 58 48 403,792 30
Simple interest 44 56 46 386,233 32
Compound
interest
43 79 84 750,137 39
Inflation 45 59 50 427,395 32
Risk
diversification
44 56 43 377,870 31
Notes: * This statistic is built from Question D27 in the EPS. Interviewees have savings if they
respond that they have any of the following: (a) Savings for a home (at a bank); (b) AVF savings
(Housing Fund admin.); (c) Voluntary pension savings; (d) Account 2 AFP savings; (e) Bank
savings account; (f ) Term deposits; (g) Mutual Fund investments; (h) Company shares or
bonds; (i) Third-party loans; (j) Other savings (cash, dollars, ‘polla’, etc.).
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
Table 6.1 Financial literacy and other characteristics of 2009 EPS interviewees
Number
of correct
financial
literacy
questions
(out of 6)
Age
(years)
Male
(%)
Secondary
education
(%)
Average
monthly
income
(CP$)*
Any
savings
(%)**
AFP
member
(%)
N
0 57 42 11 177,730 15 47 3,551
1 51 44 18 212,408 20 65 2,788
2 48 49 27 264,283 26 72 2,781
3 46 52 40 349,340 28 79 2,588
4 45 58 52 398,306 30 83 1,792
5 45 62 64 557,379 36 85 675
6 45 75 85 932,039 31 87 68
Average 50 49 29 287,731 24 68 –
Notes: The total number of observations is 14,243. * Average monthly income calculation
excludes those with zero income.
** This statistic is built from Question D27 in the EPS. Interviewees have savings if they
respond that they have any of the following: (a) Savings for a home (at a bank); (b) AVF
savings (Housing Fund admin.); (c) Voluntary pension savings; (d) Account 2 AFP savings;
(e) Bank savings account; (f ) Term deposits; (g) Mutual fund investments; (h) Company
shares or bonds; (i) Third-party loans; (j) Other savings (cash, dollars, ‘polla’, etc.).
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Financial literacy and reasons for AFP choice
Prior literature has found that few Chileans are particularly aware of
how the national retirement saving system works (Arenas et al., 2008).
To explore this further, we added questions to the EPS that elicited the
major factors influencing their fund choice, following Hastings and
Tejeda-Ashton (2008). Table 6.3 provides odds ratios from Logit analysis
of respondents’ top reasons given for selecting their current AFP, relating
these to control variables, as well as respondent financial literacy scores
(0–6).6 The first row gives the mean of the dependent variable; that is, the
fraction of people who listed each factor as their top reason for selecting
their current AFP. Overall, the most popular rationales for selecting their
current AFPs include a friend’s recommendation, the AFP’s net returns
(profitability), and an employer’s suggestion or recommendation. The
rows provide insight into how the factors included influence fund manager
selection. For instance, older respondents were significantly less likely to
say that they depended on friends’ or employers’ recommendations when
choosing an AFP, but they were more likely to select an AFP to ‘help a
salesman’ or because of the institution’s perceived ‘financial stability’.
Respondents having above median income were substantially more likely
to select an AFP based on the fund’s higher past returns; in fact, those with
above median income have 63 percent higher odds of offering this reason.
The higher income group was also much less likely to rely on employer
advice when making an AFP selection, and was more likely to seek per-
ceived financial stability.
Next, we examine the links between financial literacy and education as
influences on reasons given for AFP choice. Participants who had more
than secondary-level education (technical training or university atten-
dance) were more likely to say they elected their AFPs based on past
returns, and less likely to say they depended on employer recommenda-
tions. The same holds for financial literacy: the odds of listing returns as
important rose with the number of correct financial literacy answers, while
the odds of relying on one’s employer fell for the more financially literate.
To illustrate the relative magnitudes of the coefficients, we find that correctly
answering four financial literacy questions has the same positive impact on
the probability of choosing an AFP as having above median income.
Financial literacy and sensitivity to information framing
The fact that financially illiterate, less-educated, and lower-paid participants
relymore on their employers when choosing an AFP, and less on fund return
characteristics, suggests that such individuals may also be more sensitive to
information and framing when making a pension choice decision.
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To examine this further, our experimental framework offers a unique
setting. We combine respondent reported income levels from the 2006 EPS
with historical returns and fees data for each fund manager, in order to
estimate an anticipated ten-year fund balance net of fees for each EPS
respondent under all AFPs in the marketplace. These hypothetical account
balance figures are then reported to respondents receiving the ‘gains’
version of the fee information worksheet used in the experiment. To
construct the ‘losses’ version of worksheets, we compute the difference
between the largest ten-year account balance for each individual and each
of the other four AFPs in the menu. After fielding these experimental
worksheets, we matched each respondent’s ‘top three AFPs they would
recommend to a friend’ to our own ranking of the AFPs for that individual.7
Results appear in Table 6.4. Of the total of 8,614 participants who
received this information, 10 percent more of the respondents who saw
the gains sheet (53 percentage points) elected the lowest-cost AFP, versus
48 percentage points of those receiving the loss sheet. Evidently, people
seem more responsive to behavioral change when offered rewards, com-
pared to losses. Table 6.4 also indicates that men, the better educated, and
the higher paid were more likely to elect the lowest-cost AFP, particularly
when shown the ‘gains’ sheet.
We further examine how information framing and other factors affect
fund choice by testing for interaction effects of framing and literacy. This
permits us to evaluate which population subgroups may be most sensitive
to information framing. Table 6.5 reports Logit odds ratio results from
Table 6.4 Factors associated with respondent ranking the lowest-cost AFP the best
(AFP participants)
Ranked
lowest-
cost AFP
best
Saw
gains
sheet
(%)
Age
(years)
Male
(%)
Secondary
education
(%)
Average
monthly
income
(CP$)*
Any
savings
(%)**
N
No 48 45 54 32 297,491 28 4,923
Yes 53 46 54 41 371,975 29 3,691
Average 50 45 54 36 329,873 28 –
Notes: There are 8,614 observations in total, which is less than 9,671 self-identified AFP holders
because some interviewees do not receive the experiment. * Average monthly income calcula-
tion excludes those with zero income.
** This statistic is built from question D27 in the EPS. Interviewees have savings if they respond
that they have any of the following: (a) Savings for a home (at a bank); (b) AVF savings
(Housing Fund admin.); (c) Voluntary pension savings; (d ) Account 2 AFP savings; (e) Bank
savings account; (f ) Term deposits; (g) Mutual Fund investments; (h) Company shares or
bonds; (i) Third-party loans; (j) Other savings (cash, dollars, ‘polla’, etc.).
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 25/7/2011, SPi
Financial Literacy in the Choice of Pension Manager 109
Comp. by: pg2846 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001296837 Date:25/7/11
Time:23:18:13 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001296837.3D
analyses of whether respondents selected their lowest-cost AFPs, as a func-
tion of whether respondents received the gains or losses worksheet, and
other factors. The first column presents odds ratio results, pooling the
experimental choices across respondents who were given AFP information
as gains or losses. Receiving a gains sheet was very powerful, as this boosted
the odds of choosing the most profitable AFP and increased the odds of
selection by 26 percentage points. Quantitatively, showing participants the
gains worksheet has a measured impact as large as the impact of having a
post-secondary education, and twice as large as the impact of having above-
median income. The measured effect is slightly larger than the impact of a
one-unit increase in the financial literacy index.
Next, we add an interaction between financial literacy and information
framing in the second column, to assess whether financially literate respon-
dents are more affected by information framing. Now the odds ratio is
significant and less than 1, implying that a one-unit increase in the financial
literacy index reduces the impact of information framing by approximately
10 percentage points. It is also of interest to ask how framing interacts with
both education and income. When we add an interaction for having
received a gains sheet and having post-secondary education, the odds
ratio is significantly less than 1 for the interaction, and the indicator with
financial literacy becomes insignificant. Interestingly, the coefficient on
the interaction between information framing and financial literacy is stable
across the two specifications—only the significance changes—suggesting
that financial literacy scores and educational attainment are sufficiently
uncorrelated to effectively test their separate contributions to AFP choice.
The results suggest that education, rather than financial literacy, is a
stronger determinant of how sensitive respondents are to viewing informa-
tion in gains rather than losses. Lastly, we add yet another interaction term
testing for a joint effect of higher income and receiving a gains sheet; here,
the new interaction term is not statistically significant and the reported
odds ratio is near 1.
Conclusion
We measure financial literacy as a person’s ability to understand basic
concepts like inflation, compounding, and investment returns. Using a
new microeconomic dataset linked to experimental evidence, we have
generated responses to framing of pension fund fees and we show that,
when choosing pension funds, people with lower levels of education,
income, and financial literacy rely far more heavily on employers, coworkers,
and friends than they do on cost fundamentals. These same types of indivi-
duals are also more responsive to fund fee framing when identifying the
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relative attractiveness of pension fund managers. Moreover, the impact of
viewing information as gains is sizable, relative to the impact of various
economic and demographic factors. Specifically, seeing investment choices
as gains rather than losses is as important as the impact of having a post-sec-
ondary education, and twice as large as the impact of having above-median
income. Those who do not understand these concepts make poor fund
choices that can seriously prejudice their retirement security.
Table 6.5 Logit analysis of factors associated with respondent ranking the lowest-
cost AFP the best (odds ratios reported)
Dependent variable: respondent ranked lowest-cost AFP best
Saw gains sheet (1/0) 1.26** 1.57** 1.65** 1.66**
(0.07) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
Age 1.06** 1.06** 1.06** 1.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age-squared 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Above median income (1/0) 1.13** 1.13** 1.13** 1.15
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Male (1/0) 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Married (1/0) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Secondary education (1/0) 1.26** 1.26** 1.47** 1.47**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13)
Number of correct financial literacy questions  saw
gains sheet
1.22** 1.28** 1.26** 1.26**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Any savings (1/0){ 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Number of correct financial literacy questions  saw
gains sheet
0.91** 0.94 0.94
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Secondary education  saw gains sheet 0.73** 0.74**
(0.08) (0.09)
Having above-median income  saw gains sheet 0.98
(0.11)
Observations{{ 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 5%;
** significant at 1%.
{ This indicator is built from Question D27 in the EPS. Interviewees have savings if they
respond that they have any of the following: (a) Savings for a home (at a bank); (b) AVF savings
(Housing Fund admin.); (c) Voluntary pension savings; (d ) Account 2 AFP savings; (e) Bank
savings account; (f ) Term deposits; (g) Mutual Fund investments; (h) Company shares or
bonds; (i) Third-party loans; (j) Other savings (cash, dollars, ‘polla’, etc.).
{{ Observations are only for individuals who have all nonmissing demographic responses and
are AFP members that received the experiment. Thus, the sample is fewer than the 9,671 self-
identified AFP holders.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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The policy implications of our findings are profound. Specifically, par-
ticipant awareness of higher net-return funds can be greatly enhanced
when information on fees is simplified in terms of likely gains from select-
ing higher net return funds. The impact of fund fee framing is largest for
the least financially literate and the lowest-educated groups. By contrast,
choices made by the financially well-informed tend to be less responsive to
the information presentation, since those individuals tend to better under-
stand the financial concepts necessary to translate annual percentage rates
into costs and benefits.
Our results should interest policymakers in Chile, as well as in other
nations, including the United States, who seek to determine how to better
shape the environment in which workers make retirement saving choices.
Our research is also relevant to the broader issue of whether consumers
benefit from having more choice when it comes to products offered in
financial markets. Recent research suggests that significant cognitive costs
shape consumer decisions in a wide range of such markets from education
(Hastings and Weinstein, 2008) to credit cards (Ausubel, 1991) to Medicare
Part D (McFadden, 2006; Kling et al., 2008; Abaluck and Gruber, 2009) to
saving and retirement investment choices (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Ashraf
et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2006, 2007; Hastings and Tajeda-Ashton, 2008;
Duarte and Hastings, 2009), implying that market outcomes may be ineffi-
cient when greater choice and consumer autonomy is introduced. For
example, decision-making costs might induce consumers to place more
weight on brand names versus price in a world where product prices are
not easy to understand. If such decision-making costs were negatively corre-
lated with education, income, and wealth, such information could arouse
adequacy and equity concerns.8 As a consequence, increased choice could
actually increase socioeconomic disparities, compared to the traditional
public provision model.
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Endnotes
1 More than two dozen other Latin American countries have followed Chile’s lead
in adopting funded individual-account pensions; that nation’s pension system has
also drawn substantial attention in the United States and elsewhere.
2 We presented projected balances based on AFP-specific returns for two reasons.
First, this calculation is very close to the official calculation the government uses.
Second, we tested for persistence in AFP performance and found some evidence
that some AFPs persistently outperform others, and that this persistent outper-
formance was present in all funds within the outperforming AFP.
3 In the future, using administrative linkages, it should be possible to determine
whether participants provided with different formats for the fee tables differen-
tially and systematically changed their own AFP portfolios.
4 The EPS also has linked respondent records to a wide range of historical admin-
istrative files on contribution patterns, benefit payments, and other program
features (Bravo et al., 2004, 2006), but we do not use these here.
5 In work currently underway (Behrman et al., 2010), we also evaluate questions on
key aspects of the Chilean retirement system, including the mandatory contribu-
tion rate, the legal retirement age for women (60) and men (65), how pension
benefits are computed in the DC system, whether people are aware of the welfare
benefit available under the law, and whether people know they may contribute
additional funds to the Voluntary Pension system.
6 Note that the sample here is restricted to only those members of the EPS who
state that they participate in an AFP and have responses for all selected demo-
graphic variables.
7 Because some fund fees vary with contribution amounts, these valuations must be
tailored to each respondent’s own particulars.
8 Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008) and Duarte and Hastings (2009) analyze this
possibility in the context of Mexican pensions. Arenas et al. (2008) evaluate these
arguments in the Chilean context.
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